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LA COMPRENSIÓN DE LO SOCIAL / UNDERSTANDING THE SOCIAL
The world is a world of meaning 
(Mead, 1983: 347)1
1. DEFINITION AND AIM
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge is an evolving, 
complex theoretical, methodological and operatio-
nal concept which essentially has its foundations in 
the work of Hans-Georg Soeffner and has since been 
developed and differentiated by various researchers 
including Thomas Eberle, Ronald Hitzler, Anne Ho-
ner, Hubert Knoblauch, Michaela Pfadenhauer, Jür-
gen Raab, Jo Reichertz, Bernt Schnettler and Norbert 
Schröer. It sets out to (re)construct the social meaning 
of every form of interaction (linguistic and non-linguis-
tic) and all types of interaction products (art, religion, 
entertainment, etc.). Initially, the name ‘sociological 
hermeneutics’ was often used to refer to this method. 
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge has emerged in 
this form partly out of the criticism of the ‘metaphy-
sics of structures’ in the objective hermeneutics of 
Oevermann (cf. Reichertz, 1988), and partly through 
the debate on the socio-phenomenological research 
tradition (Schütz, 1972). 








This article aims to present hermeneutic sociolo-
gy of knowledge outside of conventional qualitative 
social research: to outline its principles, approaches 
and requirements and suggest possible areas of appli-
cation. It will not, however, be possible to entirely 
rework the approach from a marketing perspective. 
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge sees itself 
theoretically as belonging to sociology of knowledge 
and operationally/methodologically to hermeneutic, 
data-analysing, structure-analytical model-building, 
qualitative social research. This theo retical, methodo-
logical and operational concept aims to (re)construct 
the social meaning of every form of interaction (lin-
guistic and non-linguistic; face-to-face and institutio-
nal) and all types of products of action (art, religion, 
entertainment, rules and regulations, objects, pro-
ducts, services, organisations, etc.).
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge does all this 
not just as part of developing social theory in the long 
term, but also in order to understand and explain 
the actions of people and (people in) organisations, 
which can also be useful for prognosis. Hermeneutic 
sociology of knowledge is thus aimed as much at the 
individual case as the type, and at practice as much 
as theory.
It examines how subjects of action – situated and 
socialised in historically and socially developed, con-
firmed routines and interpretations of the given field 
of action (patterns, types, orders, structures) – on the 
one hand encounter and (are compelled to) appro-
priate these routines and interpretations, and on the 
other constantly lend them new interpretations and 
thereby (are compelled to) invent them in their own 
individual way. These independent reinterpretations 
of given knowledge are in turn fed back (similarly as 
knowledge) into the social field of action and change it.
From this perspective, the action of these subjects 
can only be (said to have been) understood if the in-
terpreter is able, on the basis of the collected data 
(interviews, observations, documents, etc.), to relate 
it to the given frame of reference relevant to the prac-
tice in question and show it in this way and for this 
situation to be one (for the actors) sense-making (if 
not always purpose-rational) ‘solution’. 2
2. AREAS OF APPLICATION OF HERMENEUTIC SOCIO-
LOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge has appli-
cations above all in (cultural) sociology, education 
sciences, psychology, and communication sciences. It 
is increasingly attracting a great deal of interest in or-
ganisational analysis and qualitative market research, 
primarily because it regards organisations, products 
and their design and also services as constructed prac-
tice (that is, as meaningful action) and action within 
orders. This action is also always part of internal and 
external communication and, because it has an effect, 
can (and must) be interpreted. Here there are various 
theoretical similarities and points of reference to von 
Giddens’ theory of structuration (Giddens, 1992) and 
its development by Ortmann (Ortmann, 1984), both 
of whom figure significantly in the literature of organi-
sational sociology.
Brand profiles, organisations, artefacts, design and 
service concepts and much more are never just the 
outwardly visible part of a product alone: they always 
have a form. And form – this is true for all products 
made by man – always tells us something about how 
whatever it encloses is to be understood as a whole. 
Products, services and organisations mean something 
(to us) because they have a form. Form, therefore, is 
always constructed, it is always communication.
Forms mean something. This they have in common 
with images and language. Certain forms mean cer-
tain things in certain contexts. What they mean has 
been shaped and stratified historically and is ancho-
red in the culture of a society. All competent mem-
bers of a culture have knowledge of the forms, even 
though they may not always be able to explain them 
exactly. They react to meaning without having – and 
often without being able – to verbalise it.
Qualitative methods are particularly valuable in 
market research for attempting to understand and 
explain the ‘message’ an organisation, product, ser-
vice or form is communicating in order to assess in 
advance whether the form or product suits and could 
be accepted by the target group, and whether com-
munication has been carried out properly. To this 
extent, hermeneutic sociology of knowledge is parti-
cularly useful in brand management, both for deve-
loping strategy and reviewing its implementation and 
evaluation.
Another possibility, however, (following the exam-
ple of cultural studies – cf. Bromley, Göttlich & Winter, 
1999) is to find out what happens to an organisation’s 
products and services in communication and interac-
tion, in other words how they are received and used 
by the consumer, in order to ascertain whether a 
company’s offerings have any results and if so, what 
they are and what the contributing factors were.




Since the focus of hermeneutic sociology of 
knowledge is on the analysis of interaction, it is simi-
larly very well suited to the analysis and preparation 
of sales negotiations, job interviews, business mee-
tings, presentations and management processes.
3. FOUNDATIONS IN SOCIAL THEORY
There is no social constellation that necessarily 
produces same events or things and sets them on a 
certain course anywhere in the world. Events, like pro-
ducts and organisations, take a different form where-
ver and whenever they occur. How events develop 
and products are created (and appropriated) is always 
unique, and in order to understand them, it is neces-
sary to trace their development.
History does not proceed in a straight line, one step 
after the other, but erratically, changing direction as it 
goes. It develops out of the actions, interpretations, 
hopes, problems and opportunities of individual and 
collective actors, who through their actions hope to 
address or even solve their problems. This also crea-
tes a form of social order, albeit an imperfect one 
containing inaccuracies, contradictions, retractions, 
errors, self-deceptions and coincidences.
Qualitative social research in the sense of a sociolo-
gy of knowledge approach to hermeneutics can trace 
and capture all of this, it can reconstruct the typical 
form of something that has become concrete, the 
pattern or the figure, but it cannot find any sense, ra-
tionality or function (for the common good) in it all. 
History does not unfold, it does not go on reproducing 
the same structure in action; history and interaction 
are open to development, they are mutually depen-
dent and permeating processes which from time to 
time form patterns, but still continue to seek their 
own course until the next pattern, possibly an entirely 
different one, emerges. 
The fundamental question in the sociology of 
knowledge approach to hermeneutics is captured 
by Hans-Georg Soeffner in the following words: 
“Welches Problem wurde aus der Sicht der Akteure 
wahrgenommen und durch die daran anschließen-
den gesellschaftlichen Konstruktionen bewältigt, also 
welche Motive verbanden die Handelnden mit ihrer 
Selbstzuordnung zu einer Institution, zu einem Ver-
band, zu einer bestimmten Wahrheit?�“ (Soeffner, 
2004, 40). To be able to answer this question, any in-
terpreter taking the sociology of knowledge approach 
must successively trace the practice of action and of 
life step by step in order to describe and explain how 
something came about and why in a certain situation 
something represented a ‘solution’ for a certain actor 
(further details can be found in Reichertz, 2005). 
Actions, and from a sociological standpoint this 
much seems certain, do not join together of their own 
accord (that is, out of themselves) into one higher-
level, overall action. Individual actions do not con-
tain some inherent law that compels further action 
in a certain order and certain direction from within. 
Actions must be driven and joined together by actors 
who seek meaning in their interpretations and deci-
sions. In face-to-face interaction, the participants in 
the ‘here and now’ weave a coordinated (and not 
always, but usually, complete) overall action – such as 
a conversation, a game of billiards, or a dispute. This 
interactive weaving process by no means comes out of 
nowhere: the participants draw on partly conscious, 
partly tacit knowledge of the historically and socially 
developed, and often also heavily sanctioned, practi-
ces, routines, frameworks, types and rules governing 
it. To this extent, recollection of the social groundwork 
(and knowledge of the sanctions) plays a role in every 
interaction, but the groundwork is necessarily open to 
variation and revision of recollections on account of 
the actors’ orientation towards meaning.
What is special about how actions are joined to-
gether in face-to-face interactions is that the partici-
pants remain in the situation of the ‘here and now’. 
When the face-to-face interaction comes to an end, 
the participants – if they meet again – must pick up on 
a ‘there and then’ and constantly reiterate, confirm, 
reduce or modify what was said in that interaction. 
Whatever they do, they will have to combine or con-
nect their actions in some way to achieve continuity 
and identity. Here too, socially developed practices, 
genres and rules are available for this purpose. 
Often, however, other actors (invited or uninvi-
ted, with or without power) enter into the actions of 
the ‘here and now’: other actors from a ‘there’ have 
heard of or observe an action in the ‘here and now’ 
and attach their own action to it, become involved 
or comment on it. Or they expect certain action from 
certain people in the ‘here and soon’ or ‘there and 
soon’ and shape their own actions according to what 
they anticipate in the future. For example, a bystander 
may merely remark on a game of billiards, or he or she 
may announce an intention to challenge the winner 
of the present game today or tomorrow. If, or more 
precisely because, all these actors are aware of each 
other, and because their actions affect one another, 
they create chains of actions in time and space. 








The number of people who regularly link their ac-
tions may vary a great deal, as does the intensity with 
which they are coordinated or the constancy of the 
people involved. Couples will belong to the smallest 
groups, demonstrations or events like the Love Parade 
to the larger. Some groups will connect their actions 
in time and space very frequently and repeatedly (e.g. 
married couples), others only occasionally (e.g. neigh-
bours); others still will only become involved in the 
actions of others for a specific purpose (demonstra-
tors), on a limited number of occasions (estate agents) 
or at specific times (churchgoers), and some will be 
avoided altogether, or at most encountered only once 
(fight). 
If people repeatedly combine their actions or enter 
(often by contract) into social forms (organisations) 
in which their actions are repeatedly linked together 
in a specific and coordinated way, this soon results in 
more rather than fewer fixed constellations of actors 
and more rather than fewer binding forms of the tried 
and tested, and for that environment therefore usual, 
combination of actions.
4. PREMISES OF HERMENEUTIC SOCIOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE
This is a sociology of knowledge perspective becau-
se it examines, this side of constructivism and realism, 
the big question of how subjects of action – situated 
and socialised within historically and socially develo-
ped routines and interpretations of the given field of 
action – on the one hand encounter and (are com-
pelled to) appropriate these routines and interpreta-
tions, and on the other (are compelled to) reinterpret, 
and in this way invent, them. These interpretations 
and routines are available to the members of a field of 
action in the form of knowledge, and new interpreta-
tions and routines are similarly fed back as knowledge 
into the field of action. 
Within this perspective, the subjects’ action can 
only be (said to have been) understood if the inter-
preter is able, on the basis of the collected data (inter-
views, observations, documents, etc.), to relate it to 
the given frame of reference relevant to the practice 
in question and portray it in this way for this situation 
as one (for the actors) sense-making (if not always 
purpose-rational) ‘solution’ to a problem of action. 
The term ‘problem of action’ here quite formally 
describes the situation whereby human actors must 
continually shape the course of their action. Even if it 
is theoretically unclear whether that action just flows 
steadily on, ‘quantises’ or jumps fitfully from (cons-
cious) decision to decision, in each situation the ac-
tors must pick one way of acting from all the possible 
further actions available to them. Usually, they un-
thinkingly follow traditions, routines or formulas. So-
metimes, however, they also follow an inner impulse 
or are moved in a particular direction by the dynamics 
of an interaction, and sometimes they make a cons-
cious decision, weighing up the pros and cons and 
taking the anticipated and hoped-for outcomes, and 
any unwanted consequences, into account. In such 
cases they make a conscious – and perhaps even ra-
tional – decision. No matter which of these ‘solutions’ 
people choose to solve their problem, ‘knowledge’ 
will always help to close the gap between possibility 
and realisation.
In this sense, the role of knowledge is to build a 
bridge from the ‘here’ to the ‘there’. Knowledge helps 
people to move from the ‘here and now’ to the ‘there 
and soon’. Whenever the problem of how to act next 
arises, and it does so again and again, that is where 
knowledge comes in.
‘Knowledge’ in this context is by no means to be un-
derstood as the correct reflection of an objective and 
independently existing external reality. All knowledge 
is rather the result of a specific social construction 
process. The knowledge that is purely historically valid 
at any one time is the most important tool (medium) 
an interaction community has to make its difficult en-
vironment ‘fitting’ and manageable. What is conside-
red ‘true‘ and what counts as ‘real‘ is thus the result 
of a social process of exchange (Berger/Luckmann, 
1977; Soeffner, 1994, 2004). In this regard, knowledge 
is always more than information (= how something is 
or behaves); it always bears some relation to people’s 
actions. Knowledge also always tells us what it means 
for an action in a particular world that a thing is as it 
is. Knowledge thus always contains a pragmatic com-
ponent and thereby also meaning. Knowing what a 
certain experience means for me and my actions gives 
sense to that experience. 
This perspective is hermeneutic because it aims to 
(re)construct meaning and because in its method-
driven evaluation of collected data it follows the pre-
mises of ‘sociological hermeneutics’ (Soeffner, 2004; 
Hitzler/Honer, 1997) as emerged out of criticism of 
the ‘metaphysics of structures’ in objective herme-
neutics (e.g. Oevermann et al., 1979; Reichertz, 1988). 
At their core, the terms ‘sociological hermeneutics’ 
and ‘hermeneutic sociology of knowledge’ describe 
the same research perspective (Soeffner, 2004; Soeff-




ner/Hitzler, 1994; Reichertz, 1997; Schröer, 1994 and 
1997; Hitzler/Reichertz/Schröer, 1999). In my view, 
however, the latter is the better term because it puts 
the (substantive) focus on the direction of the ques-
tion and provides a method as an attribute.
This perspective is structure analytical because the 
behaviour of the individuals is only considered to have 
been understood if the interpreter is in a position to 
relate observed behaviour to the given frame of refe-
rence relevant to the type of action in question and 
in this way show it to be meaningful. Reconstructing 
action is consequently a matter of making visible the 
structural, given (stored as knowledge) problems and 
possibilities of action which, in developing the ‘egolo-
gical perspective’, can be attributed to the protagonist 
for good reason. In other words, a veiled intentionalist 
theory of action is exactly what it is not about.
To be more precise and address any potential mi-
sunderstandings, the central point is naturally not re-
construction of the singular perspective known to the 
actors in question, as this would be destined to fail 
from the beginning. The focus is much rather on ra-
tional construction of the perspective actors are com-
pelled to take in order to deal with (a) a given task 
and (b) unavoidable underlying conditions in a given 
society. The aim is thus the rational construction of 
types of egological perspective (Schütz, 1972; Soeff-
ner, 1980).
Or to put it another way, it is concerned with (1) 
reconstruction of the structural problems individuals 
must overcome when acting within a certain fra-
mework (irrespective of whether they know of these 
problems), and (2) reconstruction of the possibilities 
for action opened up by this particular structure (and 
those which are not immediately apparent) as a ‘solu-
tion’ to these problems.
To reiterate (and address a very popular objection 
to hermeneutic research): understanding and explai-
ning events does not rely on presuppositions which 
believe that the causes of the events we are trying to 
understand lie in the special features or peculiarities 
of certain actors. Exhaustion, conflicts in relations-
hips, emotional outbursts, psychological problems, 
even the weather and other adversities may ultima-
tely determine an action, yet such ‘explanations’ are 
not only of little use to sociologists in understanding 
and explaining the past. At most they may be useful 
for storytellers.
The findings of hermeneutic studies can indeed be 
generalised, abstracted and (depending on the re-
search interest) even used to flesh out a social theory 
or a theory of society, and an attempt can be made 
to use both in understanding, explaining and possibly 
even averting current and similar processes. What is 
not possible is to identify a specific mechanism that 
necessarily produces a specific event, or to develop a 
theory which states that under certain circumstances 
a particular event must always occur.
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge is not about 
identifying subjective meaning in the sense of subjec-
tive idiosyncrasies, but always about typical patterns 
of social action that have emerged in a typical man-
ner in specific societies with a specific culture. These 
patterns form the horizon for new and subsequent 
appropriations by actors. They can be reproduced by 
the actors, but they can also be modified. These pat-
terns of social action are captured and handed down 
through experiences, stories, texts, laws and someti-
mes also in buildings.
That is why any sociology of knowledge analysis 
(even if the starting point is always individual action) 
must also look at the history (discourses) and its 
appropriation. Social action always refers to these dis-
courses and is also fuelled by them. The actors do not 
act without reason, even though their action may not 
always be rational. Action is only very rarely based on 
a well thought-out plan. It is also rarely ‘rational’ (in 
the usual sense of the word), unless, of course, ‘ra-
tional’ is taken to mean anything scientists can find 
a reason for. This, however, is ultimately only a “di-
daktisch gut brauchbares Beispiel für die Fallen der 
Erschleichung empirischer Hypothesen durch eine 
bloße definitorische Festlegung” (Esser, 1994: 172)�.
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge always be-
gins with the individual case and identifies what 
makes it different, its special features, from other ca-
ses. If scientists make broad generalisations without 
knowing about the distinctions between cases and 
events that make a difference, they are often saying 
more than they can actually answer for. One of the 
aims of science is undoubtedly also to reach general 
conclusions; it is important not to get caught up in the 
peculiarities and instead use them to develop the ge-
neral, the theory.
This is precisely what hermeneutic sociology of 
knowledge sets out to do and does: its central con-
cern is with the connecting pattern, the pattern that 
makes things comprehensible, that explains. It does 
not, as some critics claim and (apparently) also fear, 
generally avoid explaining social events. Nevertheless, 








within this type of research, it is true that ‘explaining’ 
can no longer be associated with simple determinism, 
but with probabilities.
However, this can be attributed to the special natu-
re of the object of sociology of knowledge research: 
this object (= meaningful human action) does not 
only react to the practice of the actors because they 
interpret the past and shape their actions according 
to it; the actors themselves also react very sensiti-
vely to interpretations of their actions, e.g. in science 
and academia. The more scientists address the pu-
blic in their publications and the easier public access 
to scientific findings becomes, the easier and more 
effectively science disturbs and alters the object of its 
investigations. In this way, the sciences play a role in 
shaping their subject. While this knowledge in itself is 
not particularly new, it is surprising that we need to 
be reminded of it.
5. STRATEGIES OF EMPIRICAL PROCEDURE
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge bases its fin-
dings on empirical research. It examines all forms of 
social interaction and all types of cultural event. Syste-
matic ‘discovery’ of the new is a particular focus, and 
various provisions relating to method are designed to 
facilitate the process.
For instance, in the first research phase, researchers 
should work on developing an ‘abductive attitude’ 
(Reichertz, 1991, 2003). This means that they must 
conduct their research in such a way that ‘old’ belie-
fs are seriously called into question and ‘new’, more 
viable beliefs may be developed. However, this ‘pro-
gramme’ can only be put into practice in a meaningful 
way if it is not a foregone conclusion that the collected 
data will simply reinforce established beliefs. The data 
must be able to stand up to this test.
The most resistant types of collected data in my 
opinion are non-standardised, for example audiovi-
sual recordings and taped reports (Reichertz, 2003). 
Since such data are not produced by the subjects of 
an interaction in response to the/a research question, 
and data collection itself is not informed by subjective 
perception schemata, there is a very good chance that 
they will not be immediately accounted for by the sto-
red beliefs.
If it is not possible or viable to gather non-standar-
dised data, researchers must produce their own by 
drawing up observation protocols and conducting in-
terviews. In doing so, they are well advised to work 
according to scientifically binding standards so that 
the data they produce also share the same (scientific) 
standard.
The following two principles of data collection are 
important to bear in mind: (1) researchers should go 
out into the field to collect data as naively as possi-
ble (only!) in relation to the subject of investigation 
(Hitzler, 1991). (2) Precisely at the beginning of the 
process, data collection should be as unstructured as 
possible. This is because early analytical and theoreti-
cal treatment of the material and subsequent data co-
llection at the initial stage would prematurely take the 
edge off the data on which theories are subsequently 
to be proved and honed. If researchers actively follow 
these two principles in collecting standardised data, 
there is at least structurally a possibility that the data 
will get them thinking and prompt them to question 
their ‘old’ beliefs (Reichertz, 1997). 
6. THE LOGIC OF RESEARCH 
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge uses the fo-
llowing method: during the initial stage, the data pro-
tocol is ‘openly coded’ (Strauss, 1994), which means 
that the document in question is analysed sequentia-
lly, extensively and precisely, line by line or even word 
by word. It is critical in this phase that no (already fa-
miliar) interpretation is applied to the text, but that 
the text is used to construct as many text-compatible 
interpretations, or readings, as possible. This type 
of interpretation compels interpreters to repeatedly 
break down both the data and their own (theoretical 
pre)conceptions – which creates a good climate for 
discovering new readings of the text.
If in the ‘open coding’ phase researchers are loo-
king for units of meaning (which naturally always al-
ready contain theoretical concepts and/or play with 
and refer to them), the second stage of interpretation 
involves the search for higher aggregated units of me-
aning and concepts which connect the sub-units. Now 
is also the time to justify why which (new) data should 
be collected again or more accurately. The third step 
thus involves drawing up new data protocols, albeit 
in a more targeted manner. In this way, interpretation 
controls data collection, but at the same time, and 
much more importantly, the interpretation is falsi-
fied, modified and expanded by the subsequently 
collected data. 
The process reaches its conclusion when a highly 
aggregated concept, a ‘figure of meaning’ has been 
found or constructed that brings together all the in-
vestigated elements into a meaningful whole and 




makes this whole comprehensible (meaningful) wi-
thin the framework of a specific interaction commu-
nity. The question of whether the meaning acquired 
in this way actually corresponds to the ‘reality in the 
text’ is redundant, since sociology of knowledge re-
search is always and only concerned with ‘social reali-
ty’ (for examples see Soeffner, 1992).
7. CURRENT SITUATION IN HERMENEUTIC SOCIOLOGY 
OF KNOWLEDGE
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge is currently 
taught and practised primarily at German-speaking 
universities (Konstanz, Berlin, Dortmund, Essen, Ba-
yreuth, St. Gallen, Switzerland, Vienna, Austria), yet 
there is still no concrete hermeneutic sociology of 
knowledge ‘school’. It is more a way of thinking and 
researching than a fixed method. Nevertheless, it is a 
research strategy a series of German, Swiss and Aus-
trian researchers from different sociological discipli-
nes explicitly rely on in their work. To date there has 
been no ‘official’ introduction to method in the her-
meneutic sociology of knowledge, although Soeffner 
(2004a, 2006) and Soeffner & Hitzler (1994) are consi-
dered fundamental to the subject. Schröer (1994) also 
presents and discusses the (certainly not yet harmoni-
sed) methods and procedure, while Hitzler, Reichertz 
& Schröer (1999) primarily consider the theory and 
methodology.
The first systematic description of hermeneutic 
sociology of knowledge is supplied by Reichertz & 
Schröer (1994), Reichertz (1997 and 2009), Schröer 
(1997), Knoblauch (2005) and Kurt (2004), while Ho-
ner (2011), Reichertz (1991 and 2000), Reichertz et al. 
(2010), Reichertz & Englert (2010), Knoblauch (1995) 
and Schröer (1992, 2002 and 2009) also present me-
thodologically founded research programmes. The 
cornerstone of ‘sociology of knowledge discourse 
research’ is laid in Keller (2005). Discussion and di-
fferentiation of hermeneutic sociology of knowledge 
also take place in Sutter (1997), Keller et al. (2005) and 
Tänzler, Knoblauch & Soeffner (2006) and Raab (2008). 
A discussion of the premises of hermeneutic sociology 
of knowledge can be found in Soeffner (2004b).
1 Translation: “What problem was percei-
ved by the actors and overcome by the 
ensuing social constructions; in other 
words, what motivated the actors to 
attach themselves to an institution, an 
association, to a certain truth?”.
2 Translation: “didactically useful exam-
ple of the pitfalls of the subreption of 
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